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K Y B E R N E T I K A - VOLUME 26 (1990), NUMBER 4 
ON A LOGICAL FORMALIZATION 
OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
JAROSLAV PEREGRIN 
The possibilities and limitations of a formalization of natural language by means of the common 
logical systems are investigated. The applicability of the traditional Tarskian model theory 
to natural language is discussed. The direction which the formalizing approach to natural language 
should take in order to achieve an adequate account of its semantic aspect is indicated. 
1. NATURAL LANGUAGE AS A FORMAL SYSTEM 
1.1 Formalization: How and Why? 
A description of natural language (NL) has been an objective of linguistic theory 
since Antiquity. In the recent decades the attempts at a systematic description have 
been injected by the formalizing mode of scientific thinking which has been influencing 
more or less all branches of science since the beginning of the present century. The 
formal description of natural language has proven itself to bring fruitful insight 
into the nature of our linguistic activity, and, moreover, as NL is not a mere "thing 
among things" in our world, but rather besides this also a universal means of our 
acquiring of the world, insight into our grasping of the world.1 
The importance of NL as our universal means of judging has made it also into an 
objective of the logical theory. And it was logicians, like Frege, Russell, and others, 
who have given the first formalizations of NL and who thus have initiated the 
formalizing mode of reasoning which has found its expression in linguistics later 
1 The first complex formal description of the syntactic structure of NL has been given by 
Chomsky ([9]); his formalism of generative grammar has been then, in the sixties, further elaborat-
ed and modified by numerous authors. In the seventies, the purely syntax-oriented Chomskian 
approach has been overshadowed by prevailingly semantic formalization done by Montague 
([20]) and his followers, while in the present decade still other approaches seem to get into the 
central place. 
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in Chomskian and post-Chomskian period.2 The motivation of the effort of logicians 
in the field of schematization of NL has been the desire to articulate problems 
in such a way that they could be treated formally. As Frege([14]) puts it, "the concept-
script should then serve above all to offer the most reliable test of validity of the chain 
of deductions and point out every premise, which tries to slip into it unnoticed" 
(p. IV).3 
In this paper we shall examine the usefulness of the existing systems of formal 
logic for the sake of formalization of semantics of NL. First we shall characterize 
NL in a very abstract algebraic way and then we shall test what additional restrictions 
it would have to fulfill if it ought to be identifiable with this or that logical system. 
In Section 2 we adopt the view of the model theory: we try to define such class 
of languages for which models of the kind common in logic, i.e. models interpreting 
expressions as functions and grammatical rules as some plausible operations with 
functions, are on hand. In Section 3 we discuss the most evident difficulties connected 
with the identification of NL with the commonly used logical systems. In Section 4 
we indicate in what direction the theory of formal semantics should be developed to 
provide a quite adequate formal explication of the semantic aspect of NL. 
1.2 Language as an Algebra 
In general, natural language can be viewed upon as a class of primitive expressions 
(the lexicon) and a class of rules combining expressions into complex expressions 
(the grammar). From the algebraic point of view any grammatical rule can clearly 
be understood as an n-ary function over the class of language expressions. This 
class of expressions then splits itself into pairwise disjoint grammatical categories 
in such a way that the domain of any grammatical rule is a Cartesian product of 
grammatical categories and its range is included in a grammatical category. From 
this point of view language can be considered as what can be in the most appropriate 
way called a many-sorted algebra.4 
Definition 1. A many-sorted algebra (MSA) is an ordered pair A — <C, E>, 
where (i) C = <C;>;e/ is a family of sets (the sorts of A); and (ii) E = <Ej)jej is a family 
of functions (the operations of A) such that the domain of each of them is a Carte-
sian product of sorts and its range is included in a sort. The union of all sorts of A 
will be called the carrier of A. 
Now let us define several basic notions concerning MSAs. 
2 The influence of Freegean logic on linguistics is thus twofold: it provides both a tool for 
linguistic analyses and an exemplar of a result of such analysis. This is connected with the two-
fold role of language in linguistics: its role as a tool and as an objective. 
Such an idea of logic has been immanent to logical theory since its origins, i.e. at least 
since Aristoteles. 
4 The algebraic framework adopted here is close to that of [16]. 
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Defi i.ion2. Let A = «C,.> /e /, <E;>jeJ> and A
1 = «C;> / e / . <E;>J-eJ> be MSAs 
and Jet G be a function form the carrier of A to the carrier of A'. We shall say that 
G is a homomorphism if for any E,- there exists an F\ such that 
G(E,.(Cl,...,c„))= E;(G(ct),...,G(c„)) 
for any n-tuple <c,, ..., c„> from the domain of E,. 
Language can be viewed upon as MSA. In fact, language constitutes a very special 
kind of MSA; it is for example essential that it has a finite set of generators (words) 
and that any member of any sort is a "part" of a member of a certain distinguished 
sort (sentences). However, these properties are not relevant for our present investiga-
tions, and we shall therefore identify language with a general MSA. 
Definiiion 3. A language is a MSA with a distinguished sort. The elements of the 
distinguished sort will be sometimes called statements. A sort of a language will be 
also called a grammatical category and its members expressions of the grammatical 
category. Operations will be called grammatical rules. 
Now we define the concept of a polynomial function over a MSA. Polynomial 
functions are, roughly speaking, such functions which can be "built up" from 
operations. We shall see later what they are important for. 
Definition 4. Let A = <<C,->/e/, <E/>/£j> be a MSA. Let us have for any EjJ e J) 
a symbol Fj. Let us, moreover, for any i e /have an infinite class of symbols xt ,, x,->2,.. 
called variables of type i. For an n-tuple <Cl5 ..., C„> of sorts of A and a sort 
C„+1 we define the concept of a polynomial symbol of the type « C l 5 ..., C„>, 
C„+1> over A as follows: 
(i) if Cj is the jth constituent of the n-tuple S of sorts, then xLJ is a polynomial 
symbol of type <5, C,-> over A; 
(ii) if Fj(jeJ) is an operator with its domain equal Ct x ... x C„ and its 
range included in C„+1 and if Pt, ...,P„ are polynomial symbols of the respective 
types <5*, Ci>, ..., <S, C„>, then the symbol Fj(P1, .... P„) is a polynomial symbol 
of the type <£, C„+, > over A. 
If P is a polynomial symbol of a type « C 1 , ..., C„>, C„+1>, then we define a func-
tion FP with its domain equal to Cx x . . . x C„ and its range included in C„+1 
in such a way that for any n-tuple cl5 ..., c„ of elements of the respective sorts Cl9 ... 
..., C„ the value Fp(ci, ..., c„) is defined as follows: 
(i) if P is Xfj, then FP(c1, ..., c„) = c,-; and 
(ii) i f P i s F / P , , . . . , . ^ ) , 
then FP(cu ..., c„) = Fj(FPl(Ci, ..., c„), ..., FPn(clt ..., c„)). 
In general a function E is called polynomial if there exists a polynomial symbol P 
such that E is FP. 
329 
It is obvious that any operation of A is polynomial. 
Definitions. Let A = «C i> i e J > <EJ->J-eJ> and A' = « C J > W , (F'kykeK). We shall 
say that A' is a polynomial extension of A iff J c: K and for any /ceK — J Fk is 
polynomial over A. 
A polynomial extension thus results from an addition of some polynomial functions 
to the operations of the original algebra. 
The view of language as of a MSA is a general one. It is not in contradiction with 
various more specific methodologies of formal description of natural language: 
all of them consider language as built from a lexicon by means of some rules of com-
position and all of them are thus in accordance with the present algebraic view. 
However, not any algebra is plausible to deal with. We shall expose certain views 
which would favor MS As of certain kinds and we shall discuss the question to what 
extent it is acceptable to consider NL as an algebra of such a kind. The kind of 
algebras we are going to expose are those which has become central to the symbolic 
description of NL as provided by formal logic. 
2. THE MODEL-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 A general definition of the notion of a model 
A powerful tool of the modern formal logic is the notion of model. The notion 
has been introduced by A. Tarski and since then it. has become an integral and 
indispensable part of the apparatus of logic. Moreover, a model is based on an 
assignment of some "external" objects to expressions and thus fits well into our 
intuitive idea of semantics; meanings of expressions we also consider as extrenally 
tied to the expressions they are denoted by. This is the reason why model-theoretic 
results are often (although in majority of cases quite uncritically) employed in the 
explication of semantic notions.5 
A model is an interpretation which satisfies a given theory. The notion of inter-
pretation is usually defined for some very special class of formal languages, most 
often for the first-order logic. Within first-order predicate calculus an interpretation 
means an assignment of individuals of an universe to terms and of subclasses of 
(Cartesian powers of) the universe to predicates. The interpretation of logical con-
nectives and quantifiers is considered as fixed once for all. This is a too special 
definition for our general view: we would like to define the concepts of interpretation 
and model quite generally, without any recourse to a special position of certain 
Montague (as well as other logically oriented semanticists) tacitly identifies semantic theory 
with a definition of a model-theoretic interpretation of NL. It seems that such a step needs further 
substantiation, as it is in no way clear why the explication of the notion of meaning should 
consists in a definition of a Tarskian model; however, we have not the opportunity to investigate 
into this "question here. For a detailed analysis of this problem see [25]. 
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elements of language (as e.g. the logical operators).6 What seems to be essential 
for an interpretation is that it is always defined in a "compositional" way7: its value 
for a complex expression is a function of interpretations of parts of the complex. 
Let us articulate this formally. 
Definition 6. Let A = <<C/>,ej, <-F/>je/> be a MSA and let G be a function with 
its domain equal to the carrier of A. We shall say that G is compositional iff for any 
Fj there exists a function F'j such that 
G(EXc1,...,c„}) = E;(G(c1,...,G(0) 
for any n-tuple <c1? .... c„> from the domain of Fj. 
Theorem 7. Let A = <<C,>,ei, <E/>jej> be a MSA and G a compositional function, 
then A' = <<C->/€/. <i
7}>y-j/J where C\ is G'C; (i.e. the image of Ct under G), and 
F'j is the function from the previous definition, is a MSA and G is a homomorphism 
of A into A'. 
Proof. Evident. • 
We can see that an interpretation can in general be considered as a homomorphic 
mapping of the language into a MSA. 
Definition 8. Let L be a language. A homomorphism of the M.SAL into a MSA S 
will be called an interpretation of L is S. 
In fact, what is important for an interpretation is that it interprets certain sentences 
in a special way, i.e. by some distinguished entity. An interpretation is then a model 
of a class of statements (of a theory) if it interprets all and only members of the class 
by the distinguished element. 
We have no possibility to develop a theory of many-sorted algebras in detail here. 
We shall restrict ourselves to the investigation of the question when a given language 
has an applicative interpretation. A more complicated connected problem is when 
a given theory has an applicative model, and when any theory in a language which has 
a model has an applicative model. These questions are, of course, more problematical, 
however, they can be inquired into by the same means as those exposed here. 
2.2 Applicative interpretations 
There are usually many kinds of interpretations of a given language. It appears 
to be plausible to pick up the "most convenient" of them, usually such one the 
Also more general model theories, such as Kemeny's ([17]) model theory for Church's 
typed lambda-calculus, are not general enough for us. The problem is that even Church's system 
constitutes a quite special kind of MSA. This we shall see in clarity later. 
The so-called principle of compositionality is usually attributed to Frege; however cf. [16]. 
In any case the principle has become a constitutive postulate of the whole modern formal semantic 
and formal logic. 
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operations of which are in certain sense simple. The elements of any algebra are sets; 
and it seems to be plausible for the operations to be set-theoretical functional ap-
plications. Let us distinguish the class of MSA which fulfil this condition.8 
Definition 9. A MSA A is called applicative iff there exists an injective function 
EUNCTwith its domain equal to the set of the operations of A, its range included 
in the set of sorts of A, and such that if E is an operation of A with its domain equal 
to C! x ... x C„ and its range included in C„+1, then FUNCT(F) = C, for some 
i from 1 to n, and, moreover, C, is the class of functions from Cl5 .... C,-j, Ci+l, ... 
..., C„ into C„+1 such that for any elements cl5 ..., cn of C l5 ..., C„, respectively, 
E(cl5 ..., c„) equals the functional application of ct to cu ..., c,-_l5 ci + i, ..., c„. The 
category C; is then called the functor category of E; the categories Cx, ..., Ci-l, 
Ci+1, ..., Cn are called argument categories of E. C l5 ..., C„ are called the categories 
dealt with by F. 
Definition 10. A language is called applicative if it has an applicative interpretation. 
If I is an applicative interpretation of a language L in a MSA A, then under the 
I-functor category (an I-argument category) of a rule R we shall understand the 
category mapped by I on the functor (an argument) category of the operation of A 
corresponding to R. 
Now the question arises, if any interesting class of languages can be considered 
as applicative, and especially, if NL can. To be able to answer this question we first 
have to find some simple criterion of applicativity. 
Let us assume that we have an applicative MSA. Then any rule is assigned a functor 
category. Can such an assignment of categories to rules as the functor categories 
be wholly arbitrary? Surely not: for example no category can be an functor category 
of a rule of which it is also an argument category. This follows from the fact that 
a function cannot be a member of its own domain. Moreover, a category C cannot 
be an argument category in a rule in which C is a functor category if C is an argument 
category of a rule of which C is the functor category. This indicates that in language 
which allows for applicative models there has to exist a special kind of assignment 
of categories to rules. 
Theorem 11. If a MSA is applicative, then we can index its categories in such 
a way that any rule combines expression of a category with an index AJBU ..., Bn 
with expressions of the categories Bx, ..., Bn, respectively. 
Proof. As any function must neither be a member of its own domain, nor a com-
ponent of such a member, the categories of L can be partially ordered in such a way 
For the usual definitions of the notion of model within various propositional and predicate 
calculi applicativity is implicit. Therefore it seems to be rather our applicative model what 
corresponds to the traditional notion of model in the closest way. 
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that for any rule its functor category is greater that all its argument categories. 
However, this is clearly equivalent to the possibility of the indexing in question. Q 
As there is a one-to-one correspondence between the functor categories and rules 
of a MSA and the categories and rules of any its homomorphic image we have 
Corollary 12. If a language is applicative, then we can index its categories in the 
way described in Theorem 11. 
It can be shown, that also the converse holds. 
Theorem 13. If for a language there exists the indexing described in Theorem 11, 
then it is applicative. 
Proof. Let us call those categories which are assigned noncompound indices 
ground. Let us define the function I in such a way that to any member of any ground 
category it assigns the member itself (or whatever), and to an expression E of a cate-
gory AJB1, . . . ,B„ it assigns such a function from l'B1 x ... x I'Bn into I'A
9 that 
for the relevant grammatical rule R 
I(R(E1,...,E,_1,E,EI + 1 , . . . , E „ ) ) = 
= I(E)(I(E,), ...,l(Ei_1),I(Ei+1), ...,l(En)) . 
Then / is an applicative interpretation. Q 
The existence of such an indexing, which we shall for historical reasons call 
categorial indexing, is thus a necessary and sufficient condition of applicativity.1 ° 
Let us now try to investigate the common languages of formal logic as for their 
applicativity. First, let us consider the language of the ordinary propositional logic. 
There are three categories (PROP, propositions, Ot, one-place operators, and O2 
two-place operators) and two grammatical rules (R1\Oi x PROP -» PROP and 
R2: O2 x PROP x PROP -*• PROP). We can see that for any rule there is a category 
such that it is dealt with only by the rule: Ox is dealt with only by Rl5 O2byR2; Oxthus 
can be assigned the index PROPjPROP and O2 PROP/PROP, PROP. This means 
that whatever is the interpretation I of the elements of PROP, expressions of Ox 
can be interpreted as functions from I'PROP into I'PROP and those of O2 as functions 
9 If F is a function and X a subset of its domain, then F'X denotes the set of all Fix) such 
that x is an element of X. 
1 The view of grammar as consisting of the applicative rules and connected with the categorial 
indexing has been introduced by Ajdukiewicz ([1]) and then elaborated in a systematic way by 
Bar-Hillel ([2]) and Lambek ([18]). Bar-Hillel writes: "Each sentence which is not an element 
is regarded as the outcome of the operation of one sub-sequence upon the remainder. That sub-
sequence which is regarded as operating upon the others will be called an operator the other 
its arguments", (p. 65) This exposes another motivation of the approach: the rules are considered 
as certain ways of "saturat ion" of "unsaturated" expressions (cf. [15]). The methodology of 
description of the grammar of NL by this approach is often called a categorial gramma'-. For 
a detailed exposition of its roots and history see [8]. 
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from I'PROP x I'PROP into I'PROP. If, as usual, I'PROP is the set {T, F], the 
interpretations of one- or two-place operators may be the usual truth functions. 
If we add the gremmatical categories IND of subject terms and PREDn (for any 
natural n) of n-ary predicates, and the rules R3„: PRED„ x IND x. ... x L/VD -> 
-> PROP to the propositional calculus, we gain the first-order predicate calculus 
without quantifiers. It is easy to see that also this language is applicative: PREDn 
can be assigned the index PROPJIND, ...,IND (n times). We then interpret n-ary 
predicates as functions from n-tuples of elements of FIND into I'PROP, i.e. in the 
most usual case as n-ary relations among individuals.1' 
Let us now try to add quantifiers to the language of first-order predicate calculus 
without quantification; let us for the sake of simplicity restrict ourselves to the 
monadic case, i.e. to the language with only unary predicates. We thus add the 
category QUANT, the grammatical rule R4: QUANT x PREDX -> PROP and index 
QUANT by (PROP/(PROP/iND)). However, this will not do. The reason is that 
in the resulting language we can combine quantifiers only with predicate constants, 
as there is no rule which would produce a complex predicate expression. And we 
would surely want to use quantifiers with also, for example, conjunction of pre-
dicate constants. To accomplish this we would have to add rules R5: Ox x PREDX -> 
-> PREDt and R6: 02 x PREDX x PRED1 -> PRED:; and by such an addition 
there is no more way to perform the categorial indexing and thus to consider the 
language as applicative. We can thus see that the requirement of applicativity is too 
strong to be fulfilled even by such a basic logical system as the first-order predicate 
calculus. 
2.3 Combinatorial languages 
The identification of operations of language with functional application is thus 
untenable. However, the interpretation of expressions by functions need not be done 
away in the same time. 
Let us realize that application is not the only operation which can be done with 
functions. We can, for example, compose functions. Would it not be possible to 
weaken the demands on the rules in the sense that they can be not only applications, 
but also compositions or whatever, while members of the semantic algebra remain 
functions? 
It appears that in the case of the first-order predicate calculus this is possible. 
We can identify the rule R5 with the composition of the function assigned to the 
one-place sentential operator with the function assigned to the unary predicate (and 
similarly for R6). It is necessary for this to be possible that for any p e PREDX, 
o e Oi and s eIND it holds that Ri(o,R3>i(p,s)) = R4R5((o,p),s); but this is the way 
matters really are in first-order predicate calculus. 
11 We identify a set with its characteristic function in the usual way. 
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This indicates that we can add some rules to an applicative language while retain-
ing its applicative interpretation. However, they have to be "reasonable" functions, 
and reasonable in this context means nothing other than polynomial. 
Definition 14. A language is combinatorial if it is a polynomial extension of an 
applicative language. 
Theorem 15. Let A be an applicative language and I its interpretation in an applica-
tive MSA B. Let A' be a polynomial extension of A. Then there exists a polynomial 
extension B' of B such that I is an interpretation of A' in B'. 
Proof. The statement is a consequence of Theorem 7.3 of [16]. • 
This means that we can add polynomial rules without affecting interpretations. 
This is to say that a function is an interpretation of a combinatorial language if it is 
an interpretation of its "applicative part". A language is thus.combinatorial'iff there 
exists a categorial indexing of its categories such that any rule of the language is 
polynomial over the applicative part.12 
There is also another interesting characterization of the combinatorial languages. 
We have characterized applicative systems by that their categories can be indexed 
in such a way that any rule combines expression of a category with the index (AJBX, ... 
...,B„) with expressions of the categories Bx, ...,B„. Let us write (BL -> ... 
... (B„ -> A) ...) instead of (AjBx, ..., B„) ; we thus associate a logical formula with 
any category. Then there is a rule combining expressions of the categories Cx, ..., C„ 
into an expression of the category C„+1 if the "logical index" of C„+1 "follows 
from the logical indices of Cx,...,Cn by modus ponens". Regarding applicative 
systems this is only a cumbersome articulation of what has been articulated quite 
simply before; however, this view helps us to characterize the combinatorial languages 
in a surprising way. The point is that in combinatorial languages grammatical rules 
correspond to derivational rules of certain implicational calculus: there is a rule 
combining expressions of the categories Cx, ..., C„ into an expression of the category 
C„+1 if the "logical index" of C„+1 follows from the "logical indices" of Cx, ..., C„. 
Thus, for example, a rule may combine expressions of a category AJB with expressions 
of a category B/C into expressions of the category AjC, as it holds that (B -> A), 
(C-+ B)=>(C - A).13 
2 What is closely connected with the notion of polynomialily is Church's apparatus of lamb-
da-conversion. In fact any polynomial can be viewed upon as an open lambda-term; a language 
thus can be considered as combinatorial iff any its rule can be assigned an (open) lambda-term. 
Church's formulation of the simple theory of types can thus in fact be considered as a "complete" 
combinatorial language. Another way of looking at polynomials is through Curry's and Feys' 
theory of combinators (see [12]), which is proven to be equivalent to the lambda-calculus. The 
"combinatorial turn" in categorial grammar has been taking place recently — see e.g. [28]. 
1 3 For a detailed exposition of this problem see [4]. Cf. also [29]. 
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3. THE FORMALIZATION OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
3.1 Extensionality vs. intensionality 
The logistic systems explicating the semantics of NL such as the so-called Montague 
Grammar, based on the investigations of Montague ([20]), or Tichy's Transparent 
Intensional Logic (see e.g. [30]), are based on Church's typed lambda-caculus ([10]) 
and thus in fact on a combinatorial language. In this logical calculus the categories 
are defined as follows: there are two ground categories, o (propositions) and i (indivi-
duals); and if a and /i are categories, then (a/3) is also a category (in contrast to the 
above used Ajdukiewicz's notation, Church uses (a/3) instead of a\ff). Complex 
expressions are constituted by means of application and lambda-abstraction; we 
know that this is equivalent to having combinators as grammatical rules. (As any 
closed lambda-term is expressible as an application of suitable combinators to 
constants of the lambda-term, we can also see that variables are not necessary; 
they only make everything technically simpler). 
Church has introduced what is usually called postulates of extensionality; they 
in fact guarantee that (i) any two statements with the same truth value are inter-
substitutive salva veritate for any theory admissible in his system; and (ii) that 
any two predicates which for any arguments yield the same value are inter-
substitutive salva veritate for any such theory. However, as it has soon become clear, 
the interpretation intended by Church, i.e. the interpretation of statements by truth 
values and predicates by classes of (n-tuples of) actual individuals is inadequate 
with respect to NL. Such predicates as "human" and "featherless biped"14 are 
to be of the category (ot) in Church's system, and as the classes of actual individuals 
to which they truthfully apply are identical, they coincide. However, there is surely 
a true statement which becomes false if we substitute human for featherless biped 
in it (for example the statement A shaved circus bear might be a feartherless biped), 
and thus Church's extensionality postulates fail to render the factual character of NL. 
This fact has been clear at least since Carnap ([6]) and it has been under a thorough 
discussion since sixties. The seemingly simpler way out of this mess, to drop the postu-
late of extensionality, leads to the loss the plausible set-theoretical interpretation of 
the language. Therefore another way has been largely exploited: to schematicize NL 
by means of an extensional formal language, however, to accopmish the schematiza-
tion in such a way that statements are not considered as of type o, i.e. they are not 
interpreted by truth-values, but they are rather assigned a compound type interpreted 
by means of functions from objects of a newly introduced type, the type of possible 
worlds, into the set of truth-values. 
The best example of the strategy is constituted by Tichy's Transparent Intensional 
Logic (TIL). Tichy modifies Church's logical system in that he adds new simple 
categories to (possible worlds) and T (time moments), and assigns the category ((OT) OJ) 
14 Tnis rs a famous example from [6]. 
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to NL sentences. Unary predicates then turn out to be of the category (((01) T) CO) etc. 
Tichy thus works with a calculus which is in fact extensional, he, however, relates 
it to NL in such a way that NL comes out as non-extensional.15 
3.2 Predication and nominalization 
There is also another problem which the "categorial" approach to NL has to face. 
There is a strong intuition indicating that two expressions of different categories 
have to be interpreted by one and the same item. If this were true, the view of inter-
pretation as a homomorphism would clearly become untenable. 
Let us consider an adjective and its nominalization, say clever and cleverness. 
To say that one is clever means to say that cleverness belongs to him. From this 
it seems to follow (see the detailed considerations of [24]) that the two words have 
one and the some denotation. This is also the way in which matters are in Church's 
formulation of the theory of types. Clever denotes a function from individuals 
to truth values and so does cleverness; predicates applicable to cleverness then denote 
functions from these functions to truth values. 
However, there are predicates which are evidently predicable both of individuals 
proper and of nominalized predicates. This is the case of, say, good. Schematically, 
if we denote the class of individual terms proper as /, the class of individual predicates 
by P, the class of predicates predicable of nominalized individual predicates as P ' 
and the class of statements as S, predication can be viewed upon as two rules: Rt: 
P x I -> S and R2: P' x P -> S. However, as soon as we accept that predicates 
of P' apply to individuals as well, we have also the rule R3: P ' x / —> S. It is not 
difficult to see that any grammar containing Rl5 R2 and R3 can be neither applicative 
(in the sense exposed above), nor combinatorial. This phenomenon has been studied 
by Cocchiarella ([11]), he adds an apparatus of nominalization to predicate logic. 
It is clear that as soon as we can turn any first-order predicate into an individual, 
we can turn any second-order predicate into a first-order, and hence into an indi-
vidual and so on; thus having introduced nominalization the whole theory of types 
collapses into the first-order case. In this way, however, the whole idea of type-
theoretical treatment of NL seems to be questioned. Chierchia's application of 
Cocchiarella's ideas to concrete linguistic problems (see [7]) as well as Turner's ([32]) 
elaboration of another similar system with nominalization (based on Scott's models 
for type-free lambda-calculus — see [26]) indicate that also systems without the 
strict typization are worth investigation. 
1 5 The matters seem to be more complicated with respect to Montague; his logical system 
seems to be really overtly nonextensional. However, the semantic interpretation of Montague 
Gramar is based on a tacit "type-lifting" which results in a model theory of the same form as 
that of Tichy. It is characteristic that Janssen in his extensive monograph on Montague Grammar 
([16]) introducing the Montague's logical system first introduces a language Ty 2, very close 
to TIL, and then he defines Montague's logic in its frames. 
337 
3.3 Indirect description by means of first-order logic 
We have seen that even the complete combinatorial grammar, i.e. the whole theory 
of types is disputable as for its adequacy for the purpose of schematicizing of NL. 
On the other side, we would like to have a schematization of NL in frames of a much 
simpler logical system. The reason is that we have no effective proof apparatus 
for predicate logic of an order higher than the first one. For the first-order logic, 
we, on the other side, do have a method which has allowed us to implement deduction 
on a computer. 
So far we have considered logic as a more or less direct schematization of NL. 
This means that we have considered any constant of a logical calculus to symbolize 
a NL expression and any grammatical rule of such a calculus to represent a corre-
sponding rule of NL. This is the way in which logic can be made sense of; however, 
we may accept that a logical formula need not schematicize directly the expression 
we are considering, but some its paraphrastic forms. This is to say, considering 
a statement of the form 
John loves Mary faithfully 
we may consider it to be schematicized by the first-order formula 
3E(Event(E) & Loving(E) & Ac(John, E) & O/3/(Mary, E) & Faithful(E)) 
which in fact schematicizes the paraphrase 
There is an event of loving such that John is its actor , 
Mary its objective, and it is faithful. 
This example indicates in what way an adverb, which is usually conceived as 
a predicate of a higher order, can be turned into a first-order predicate by means 
of this "paraphrastic strategy". 
The introduction of events, illustrated by this example, is the idea of Davidson 
([13]). Recently it has been picked up and further elaborated in [21]. It shows that 
while on one side even very complex logical systems seem insufficient for the purposes 
of schematization of NL, on the other side we can accomplish interesting results 
with quite simple logical means if we use them adjointly.16 
4. TOWARDS A WHOLLY ADEQUATE FORMALIZATION 
OF THE SEMANTIC ASPECT OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
An adequate formalization of the semantic aspect of NL is still something to be 
inquired into. We have seen in the previous chapter what problems could be connected 
with the application of the common "ready-made" logical systems (which have 
1 6 See also [23]. 
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arisen from considerations of various restricted parts of NL) to the NL in its entirety. 
It is surely useful to try to find ways how to handle as much of NL as possible in their 
frames, as the achievements of logical theory are valuable; however, on the other 
side, seeking for the real character of the semantic aspect of NL we cannot use 
a present form of logic as a mould into which NL has to be squeezed cost what it 
may. As we have stated elsewhere ([24]), theory is not to "repair", but rather to 
explicate. 
The import of logic for semantics consists besides other in the fact that logic has 
indicated in what way a quite simple semantical account of the core of NLcan be given. 
Sentences of the ordinary subject/predicate structure, their conjuncts by means 
of ordinary connectives, even the basic modal and temporal adverbs — all of this 
can be schematicized by existing languages of formal logic and in this way furnished 
by suitable model-theoretic interpretation. There are, however, parts of NL which 
cause serious problems to any existing logical system.17 To be able to give a proper 
logical account of all parts of NL including the peripheral ones, we have to perform 
diligent empirical considerations of the language, i.e. a full-fledged linguistic analysis. 
Results of theoretical linguistics relevant for the formalization of semantics, which 
have been achieved by all the various linguistic schools up to now, are, however, 
often presented in the form which seems to be indigestible for a logician. A logical 
interpretation of an expression is usually a function of the kind which has been 
described above; linguistics, on the other side, often presents the "semantic content" 
of an expression in a form of a diagram, typically a tree, connecting linguistic items, 
present in thee expressions, by labelled arcs. Is there a bridge between these two 
views of meaning? 
The extensional account of semantics, as well as the intensional one in its pure form, 
is based on the assumption that the internal syntactic structure of an expression 
is irrelevant from the semantic point of view. This assumption has, however, been 
challenged seriously in the recent years: many new formal theories of meaning 
which have appeared in the present decade accept a tacit assumption that meaning 
is structured in a way corresponding to the way of structuring of the expression by 
which it is denoted. Roots of such an assumption can be found in Carnap's notion 
of intensional isomorphism (see [6]); as a prominent example of this kind of theory 
we can name the situation semantics ([3]) in which meanings are modeled by means 
of situations, which are set-theoretical objects, decomposable into a relation (corre-
sponding to a verb), objects to which the relation apply (corresponding to the parti-
cipants of the verb), location (corresponding to a local adverb) etc. In [31] Tichy 
presents a comprehensible account of what the proper place of a notion of a con-
struction, a language independent entity expressed by an expression and mirroring 
its structure, in frames of the Fregean logic could be. 
1 7 Such problems are numerous and their extensive definition keeps taking place in semantic 
literature. Let us mention at least the problem of the verbs of intensional attitudes ([5], [19], [22], 
and also [27]). 
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However, in connection with this new approach to semantics it is necessary to 
keep in mind the fact that the correspondence of the structure of an expression and 
that of the meaning denoted by it cannot be absolute. If it were, semantic analysis 
would be a mere triviality. Besides this, and this is the main reason, it is clear that 
expressions which differ in syntactic structure can be synonymous. This fact can be 
accounted for by that it is not the surface structure what is relevant for the structure 
of meaning, but rather a "deep" structure. From the semantic point of view it is 
thus not the grammatics what is relevant, but rather a "tectogrammatics" (for the 
notion of tectogrammatics see [27]). 
This is the point at which the logical theory of interpretation and the linguistic 
theory of content seems to meet each other. There is, however, much to be done, 
in order to achieve a really firm connection between them. In order to build a formal 
theory of semantics which would be not only technically plausible, but also empirically 
adequate, this seems to be nevertheless essential. 
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